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THE MIGRATORY DIVORCE
GEORGE W. STUMBERG*

In most of the American states a divorce is relatively easy to obtain.
The statutory grounds are broad and have frequently been made
broader by judicial decision. Given a sympathetic judge and a not
too recalcitrant spouse, cruelty, particularly of the mental variety,
can cover a multitude of sins, whether of omission or commission.
There should be no valid reason for a husband or a wife living in one
of these states to migrate elsewhere solely to sure a decree dissolving
the marriage. However, they sometimes do. One reason may be to
avoid local publicity.' Another may be to work a fraud on the respondent spouse by alleging in the foreign proceedings grounds which,
while valid at home, cannot be sustained there.2 When the suit is
brought abroad the other spouse, if he wishes to contest, can only do
so at great inconvenience and risk. The risk consists of the possibility that the foreign forum will decide against him by giving a more
sympathetic and so more liberal application of a local cause or ground
than the same cause or ground would be given back home.
In a minority of states the permissible grounds for divorce are limited. In South Carolina it was impossible until recently to secure an
absolute dissolution of the marriage under any circumstances.' In
New York adultery is the only ground.4 In some of the other states,
* Professor of Law, University of Texas.

See ln re Englund's Estate, 45 Wn.2d 708, 277 P.2d 717 (1954), where Mrs. Englund testified that she went to Idaho "to get away from it all."
^See Reed v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 409, 187 S.W.2d 660 (1945). A decree secured
ex Parte in Oklahoma by the defendant who was prosecuted for bigamous cohabitation
in Texas was held not to be a defense. The Oklahoma domicile was simulated.

- See Brearley, A Note on Migratory Divorce, 2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLES
329 (1935).
4

For a discussion of the judicial attitude toward divorce in New York with special
reference to migratory decrees, see Tobias Weiss, A Flight on the Fantasy of Estoppel
in Foreign Divorce, 50 COL. L. Rxv. 409 (1950). See also Annulments for FraidNew York's Answer to Reno, 48 COL. L. Rxv. 900 (1948).
331

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[WINTER

while the strictures may not be as severe as in New York, the list
of causes is not so generous as in the majority of states. In these
minority states, including, of course, New York, it may be felt by
those who wish to be freed absolutely from the chains of matrimony
that there is a real reason for having a try at bringing suit elsewhere.
It should be added that restrictions in some states on remarriage
within a given period after the decree is granted may offer a temptation to a spouse who wishes to remarry in haste to migrate elsewhere
in order to secure a decree which would be subject to no such restrictions.'
If, no matter what the reason for the migration, the spouse who
has obtained the foreign decree returns to his usual abode, a court
there may be confronted with the problem of the local effect of the
decree. The problem is one which has been with us with varying degrees
of intensity since almost the very formation of the American Union.
The earliest reported case involving a migratory divorce seems to
be Jackson v. Jackson, decided by a New York court in 1806.6 Nancy
Jackson, unable to adjust herself to physical abuse by her husband,
discovered through her attorney that she could file suit for divorce
in Vermont without becoming a resident there. Not only did the
Vermont court grant the divorce decree, but it also granted alimony.
Suit on the alimony decree was brought in New York. Her husband,
Archibald, not denying the physical abuse, insisted that he had at all
times been faithful to Nancy. Since the Vermont court granted its
decree on a ground not permitted in New York, it was not, so he contended, entitled to recognition as valid in that state. Dismissing
Nancy's suit, the court in effect reprimanded her for attempting to
work a fraud, not only on her husband, but also on the State of New
York." Shortly after the Jackson case, Vermont ceased to be a tempting haven in this respect, since the legislature provided for residence
by the petitioner for a protracted period of time. Other state legislatures had already done so or followed suit. In most of the states the
5
1n some states by statute, parties to a divorce action are, without regard to fault,
forbidden to marry until the expiration of a year after the decree. In a number of
these states a marriage in a state having no such provision has been held to be bad
when contracted by domiciliaries. Cf. Peters v. Peters, 177 Kan. 100, 276 P.2d 302
(1954). In other states the decree does not become final until after the expiration of
a given time, such as one year. Similar legislation in Washington was repealed.
6Jackson v. Jackson, 1 John. 424 (N.Y. 1806).
7 Cf. Sewall, J. in Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260 (1813), at 265: "I must . . . say,
the operation of this assumed and extraordinary jurisdiction [Vermont's] is an annoyance to the neighboring states, injurious to the morals and habits of their people...."
"The alimony decree would not be entitled to full faith and credit today because of lack
of a jurisdiction 'in personam.'"
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required period of residence became a year or more.' However, the
New York courts at an early stage took the position that a divorce
granted abroad was invalid in New York as to a spouse domiciled
in that state without regard to the domicile by the petitioning spouse
in the decree-granting state. In other words, the restrictive divorce
policy of New York was applied to all foreign divorces where the
respondent was a citizen of New York. It will be recalled that this
issue came to a head in the case of Haddock v. Haddock.9 There the
husband and wife married in New York where they then lived. Shortly
after the marriage the husband moved to Connecticut, where he in
due course obtained a divorce ex parte upon an allegation of desertion.
His wife subsequently sued in New York for judicial separation and
maintenance. The New York courts refused to give full faith and
credit to the Connecticut decree in spite of the fact that the husband
had acquired a Connecticut domicile, a matter which was not disputed.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. Speaking for a bare
majority,10 Chief Justice White laid down three conditions, one of
which must exist in order for a foreign divorce decree to be entitled
to full faith and credit. (1) If the divorce is granted ex parte, the
decree-granting state must be the matrimonial domicile. If the decree
is granted in a state which is the domicile of the petitioning spouse
alone and not the matrimonial domicile, (2) the respondent must be
served locally with process or appear, or (3) the respondent must
also be domiciled within the state granting the petition. When the
Supreme Court overruled the Haddock case in the first Williams case,"
the concept of matrimonial domicile as a jurisdictional requirement
for purposes of full faith and credit was eliminated. Instead, a decree
granted at the domicile of the petitioning spouse, although ex parte,
became entitled to full faith and credit. Also, it was subsequently held
that if the respondent appears to contest jurisdiction on the merits
8 According to a statement in the Jackson case, at the time the Vermont decree was
granted the legislature had already provided for residence, but the statute had not yet
gone into effect. The fact that there was no jurisdiction in personam to enter the
alimony decree was not discussed by the New York court.
0 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). Cf. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S.
155 (1901), where the New York courts were compelled to give full faith and credit to
a Kentucky decree. The respondent wife had left the husband to return to New York.
Kentucky was the marital home.
1oThe decision in the Haddock case was five to four. The majority did not hold
that the Connecticut decree could not be given full faith and credit. They merely held
that New York did not have to do so. A number of state courts even before the first
Williams case accorded recognition to decrees granted at the domicile of the petitioning
spouse. Of course, it was this point of view which finally won out in the first Williams
case (see note 11) as a mandate of full faith and credit.
11 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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and the case goes against him, the decree cannot be attacked elsewhere, even by persons not parties to the divorce procedings.' 2 At the
same time, the position was taken in the second Williams case that,
when a decree is granted ex parte, it may be attacked elsewhere upon
an affirmative showing that the petitioning spouse was not in fact
domiciled in the decree-granting state; otherwise, not." The result
of the shift from matrimonial domicile to domicile in fact of one of
the spouses is that courts in states like New York, which have had a
policy to the contrary, must now grant full faith and credit to foreign
decrees granted at the domicile of the petitioning spouse, even though
the respondent is a local domiciliary or has become a resident since
the rendition of the decree. On the other hand, if the decree is not one
granted at the domicile and there has been no appearance, it is not
entitled to recognition elsewhere." It would seem then that decrees
granted ex parte in states where the required periods of residence are
short are, from the point of view of full faith and credit, suspect, at
least where the petitioning spouse returns to his former abode shortly
after the divorce is granted, since a stay of a short period would negative the intent required for domicile.'
Reference has already been made to the fact that residence of a
year or more by the petitioning spouse became the requirement for
divorce in most of the states. However, beginning in the late 1920's,
several state legislatures shortened considerably the necessary period.
These states include Nevada, Arkansas, Idaho, and Florida. Until
1927 the residence period in Nevada was six months. In that year
it was reduced to three. Arkansas followed suit in 1931 by reducing
its period from one year to three months. Idaho did likewise approximately two weeks later by enacting a ninety-day law. The action of
these two states induced Nevada further to reduce its period to six
weeks. Finally in 1937 Florida adopted a ninety-day law. In all four
states the avowed purpose was to induce discontented spouses to
migrate temporarily for the purpose of securing divorces. In effect,
12 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948). The
same result was reached with respect to a daughter of the earlier marriage on the
ground that in Florida, where the decree was granted, she could not collaterally attack.
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
"3
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S.
126 (1951) to the effect that the one attacking the foreign decree has the burden of
showing lack of domicile and hence the non-existence of jurisdiction.
14 See Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 13.
35To acquire a domicile in a particular place, a person must not only be there, but
he must intend to remain there for an indefinite period of time. See Dupuy v. Wirtz,
53 N.Y. 556 (1873).
16 See note 18, infra.
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invitations were issued to those who might be weary of their matrimonial status to come to them, where, after a short stay, unhappy spouses
could be freed from their matrimonial bonds. Hotels, motels, apartment houses, and places of amusement would benefit appreciably and,
who knew, the migrants might even remain after their immediate
objective had been attained." Nevada, in reducing her period to six
weeks, hoped to gain through volume more than she might lose through
shortness of stay. The ultimate fate of Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix, the defendants in the second Williams case, illustrates a danger
involved in going to a short-residence state to secure a divorce, since
in that case the pair who had obtained Nevada decrees were convicted
in North Carolina, where they resided and to which they returned,
of bigamous cohabitation upon a jury finding that they had not
acquired bona fide domiciles in Nevada.1 8 However, the extent of the
risk should be measured by reference to the lack of zeal of public
prosecutors and to the attitude of courts under a doctrine of what
has sometimes been called estoppel' 9 -erroneously, it seems to be generally admitted. The New York case of Starbuck v. Starbuck2 1 is a
relatively early illustration of a decree which was treated as valid for
a particular purpose, although it was assumed not to be entitled to
full faith and credit. In that case the claimant had married the
decedent, a resident of New York, in Massachusetts. After several
years of cohabition in New York, she left him. Returning to her
former home in Massachusetts, she procured in that state a divorce
ex parte on the ground of extreme cruelty. Upon the death of her husband, she asserted a claim for dower in his New York lands, all of
which had been acquired after the Massachusetts divorce. Her claim
was rejected upon the thesis that she, having sought the jurisdiction
of the Massachusetts court, should not be permitted to assert the
invalidity of its decree. To permit her to do so would be inequitable.
But the notion that it might be inequitable for a person to assert the
invalidity of a foreign decree did not stop with its application to
instances where the one who obtained the decree was asserting its
invalidity. It was also applied in New York when the respondent who
17 For an account of the enactment of short term residence statutes see Bergeson,
The Divorce Mill Advertises, 2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 348 (1935). The

residence requirement in Idaho is now six weeks. Idaho Code Ann. Sec. 32-701.
18 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
19 See generally Weiss, A Flight on the Fantasy of Estoppel in Foreign Divorce,
50 COL. L. Rav. 409 (1950) ; Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce, 2 LAW AND CoxTEMOPARY PROBLEMS

335 (1935) ; Merrill, Utility of Divorce Recognition Statutes,

27 TEx. L. REV. 291 (1948)
20 Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N.Y. 503, 66 N.E2d 193 (1903).
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did not appear in the foreign proceedings had remarried. For example,
in Carbulon v. Carbulon2" the wife, who had remarried, attempted to
enforce a New York order for maintenance against her first husband,
who had obtained a Connecticut divorce decree after the entry of the
maintenance order. The New York court held that the "plaintiff could
not assert that the marriage relation with the defendant remained
unaffected by the foreign decree and at the same time assert that she
had legal capacity to marry another." It might be worth mentioning
that in both these cases the foreign decrees were granted under circumstances where they would now be entitled to full faith and credit.2
However, the courts of New York have applied the doctrine of estoppel or inequity to decrees which, under the second Williams case, would
be subject to attack because the petitioning spouse had not acquired
a domicile in the decree-granting state. Krause v. Krause2' is an illustration. The husband had secured a Nevada decree. Upon his return
to New York he remarried. Later his second wife sued for judicial
separation and maintenance. His defense that the second marriage
was invalid because of the invalidity in New York of the Nevada
decree was denied.
Since the Williams cases, divorces, even though subject to collateral
attack, have been given effect for some purposes between the parties
in other jurisdictions 4 In California, for example, a person who
remarries or marries one of the divorced spouses may not question
the validity of the decree. Again, the one who procured it may not
challenge it.2 1 In Washington the supreme court has gone further
than most courts apparently have, since it has held that a stranger
may not attack the decree when property claims are involved. In the
case of Wampler v. Wampler 2 decided in 1946, the court announced
a doctrine to the effect that, whatever may be the sphere of estoppel
or inequitable conduct where property claims are involved, it has no
application to a matrimonial action. The wife, who had secured an
earlier decree in Idaho, sued her first husband, who had remarried,
for divorce. The respondent contended that the wife's suit was barred
by the Idaho decree, which she, as petitioning spouse in Idaho, could
Carbulon v. Carbulon, 293 N.Y. 375, 57 N.E.2d 59 (1944).
In the Starbuck case the petitioner was domiciled in Massachusetts. In the Carbulon case the fact that the petitioner was probably domiciled in Connecticut was not
referred
to.
2
- 3 Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940).
24 For cases in general, see 175 A.L.R. 538 (1948). For cases involving attacks by
parties without interest on domestic and foreign decrees, see 28 A.L.R2d 1328 (1953).
25 For a discussion of the California cases, see 42 CAL. L. REv. 503, 507 (1954).
26
Wampler v. Wampler, 25 Wn2d 258, 170 P.2d 316 (1946).
21
22
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not attack. The contention was denied on the ground that this was a
matrimonial action and not one involving property rights.
The general theory of the Wampler case was followed in In re
Tamke's Estate" but with a different result. The wife, who had
obtained a decree from Tamke in Nevada and immediately thereafter had married another and then returned to Washington, filed a
petition there to be appointed administratrix of Tamke's estate. The
contest was between her and a brother of the deceased. The court
below appointed Mrs. Tamke, but this was reversed on the ground
that this was not a matrimonial action, as was the suit for divorce
in the Wampler case. On the contrary, so it was held, the suit was
one to determine conflicting property claims. It might be noted that
in the Tamke case a second marriage (by Mrs. Tamke to one Lavier)
had been annulled at the instance of Lavier, apparently on the ground
that an annulment suit involves matrimonial status. The over-all
result of the case is that Mrs. Tamke was not married to Lavier, her
second husband, because she was still married to Tamke, since her
Nevada divorce from him was invalid. At the same time, she was
not married to Tamke insofar as any claim against his estate might
be concerned.
However, according to In re Englund's Estate,8 a later decision,
if Mrs. Tamke's marriage to Lavier had not been annulled and if it
had been Lavier who died, she would have succeeded in a contest with
his brothers and sisters, because her deceased husband would not
have been able to assert the invalidity of the foreign decree, since he,
having married with knowledge and not having disclaimed the marital
status, would have been precluded from denying while alive its effectiveness with respect to property rights. Those claiming through him
could have no greater rights than would he.29 The subtle nuances, not
only in Washington, but in other states as well, might be expressed in
terms of "Off again Finnegan, on again Finnegan" or "Button, button,
where's the button?"
No one, not even the courts, have been able to give a satisfactory
explanation of the partial recognition doctrine beyond stating that it
would be inequitable under the circumstances to permit an attack
upon a decree which otherwise is not entitled to full faith and credit.3"
In re Tamke's Estate, 32 Wn.2d 927, 204 P.2d 526 (1949).
In re Englund's Estate 45 Wn.2d 708, 277 P.2d 717 (1954). See It re Lindgren's
Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1944) in which a daughter was permitted to attack,
even though her father could not.
29 The case is noted 43 CAL. L. REv. 881 (1955).
203See note 19 siupra for general discussions of the estoppel doctrine.
27
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An explanation of the earlier Starbuck8" case might be that it was
decided when the New York courts were following a strict, and harsh,
policy with respect to nonrecognition of foreign decrees insofar as
they might affect the status of residents of New York. The decision
may have reflected a spirit of repentance at the strictures imposed
in not according recognition to a decree granted at what was admittedly the domicile of the petitioning spouse. If this repentance was
a contributing cause, the reason ceased with the first Williams case,
since now the same decree would be entitled to full faith and credit.
Seemingly the same feeling exists today because of the difficulty involved in getting a divorce at all in New York.32
In any event, whose equities are involved? In the Washington
Tamke' l case, the wife migrated to Nevada, apparently to secure a
divorce more quickly, so that she could remarry sooner. In the
Englund case 4 she migrated to Idaho for much the same purpose. In
both instances the wives wanted to eat their cake and have it too.
They wanted divorces which, on the facts, they might not be able to
get at home, but they also wanted to keep their homes in Washington.
In neither case was anyone misled. Their husbands were no piano
players who were unaware of what was going on upstairs. The second
consorts were no Alices in Wonderland. All concerned seemed to be
satisfied with the arrangements except Mr. Lavier (Mrs. Tamke's
second spouse), and he apparently became dissatisfied only after
Mrs. Tamke assaulted him. In the Tamke case it might have been
unfair to permit Mrs. Tamke to succeed, since she would have gained
had the decision gone the other way. She was in effect asking for an
additional piece of cake. However, in the Englund case Mrs. Englund
was allowed to profit by securing the Idaho decree and then remarrying. To change about language employed in some of the cases, she
profited by her own wrong, assuming that to migrate temporarily to
Idaho to secure a divorce which could not be gotten as quickly at
home was wrong. But was it wrong? Perhaps it was not. That would
be a matter for the domiciliary forum to decide.
There is nothing in the Constitution which forbids the action taken
by the Washington and other courts. The Supreme Court has never
held that a divorce granted in a short-term residence state, even without domicile there, is void in the state where granted. The basis for
31 Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N.Y. 503, 66 N.E.2d 193 (1903).

note 4 supra.
In re Tamke's Estate, 32 Wn.2d 927, 204 P.2d 526 (1949).
It re Englund's Estate 45 Wn2d 708, 277 P.2d 717 (1954).

3? See
33
3
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so holding would be denial of due process by the decree-granting state.
Insofar as property is concerned, the respondent spouse loses no more
than nebulous expectancies in future acquisitions. Whether a husband
or wife has a right to consortium with an unwilling spouse seems more
than questionable. It would appear then that an attack on due process
grounds would fail. If the decree is valid where granted, there is
nothing to preclude its recognition as valid elsewhere for any purpose.
All that the Supreme Court has held is that a decree granted ex parte
at the domicile of the petitioning spouse must be given full faith and
credit; if not so granted, it need not be given recognition elsewhere.
This is quite different from saying it must not be accorded full faith
and credit if it is granted in a state which is not the domicile of the
petitioning spouse."
It may be that recognition, though not required, is the direction in
which courts giving a broad scope to the estoppel-inequity doctrine
are going. The fact that the state rarely intervenes through criminal
proceedings or that annulment suits grounded on the invalidity of the
foreign decree are relatively infrequent, and then often employed as a
convenient substitute for divorce proceedings,"8 seems to indicate
that, as a practical matter, this may be the point almost reached in
the State of Washington as a consequence of the Englund decision.
At the same time the fuller the recognition accorded a foreign decree
becomes, the more easily a spouse by migrating (for a short stay) can
flout with impunity the divorce policy of his own state. In this connection it might be added that those who can conveniently migrate
are relatively few. Even a sojourn of six weeks in Las Vegas or Reno
plus the two or three weeks it may take to secure the decree, to say
nothing of the longer stay in Hot Springs or Miami, requires leisure
and money. The vast majority, those who have neither the finances
nor the leisure, must remain at home to abide by the requirements of
their local law. Consequently, unrestrained recognition can result in
discrimination between those who have and those who have not, or,
at least, those who have less.
Critics of judicial resort to the estoppel-inequity doctrine to expand
voluntary recognition of foreign ex parte decrees beyond the point
required by full faith and credit, at times seem to assume that recog3
1In the second Williams case, note 13, Justice Murray in a concurring opinion
seemed to assume that the Nevada decree was valid in that state. See 325 U.S. at 242.
The Chief Justice and Justice Jackson joined in his views. Cf. the language of Justice
Rutledge at 325 U.S. at 246.

38 But see 48 COL. L. REv. 900 (1948), in which annulment in New York as an
answer to Reno is discussed.
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nition is being given to something which has no validity whatever."
The implication is that the courts are surreptitiously bringing about
unlawful results or, even worse, closing their eyes to alleged immoral
activities and so in effect encouraging them. There is nothing illegal
in going abroad to secure a divorce, even though the resulting decree
may not be entitled to full faith and credit. Perjury by the petitioning spouse would, of course, be a crime in the state where the testimony is given, but unless it were of a sort that would make the decree
subject to collateral attack where granted, it would, from what has been
said, be valid there. Whether it should be given effect at the domiciliary forum should be a matter to be decided there by reference to
questions pertaining to the desirability of protecting domestic divorce
policy through discouraging migration solely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, rather than by reference to a priori assumptions of
misconduct. If, in the second Williams case," the Supreme Court of
North Carolina had reversed the conviction below, it would have meant
no more than an indication that the activities of Mr. Williams and
Mrs. Hendrix were a matter of indifference to the State of North
Carolina. As it was, in affirming the conviction, the North Carolina
court in effect took the position that it would be disruptive of the overall local divorce policy to permit the two to go to Nevada solely to
secure a divorce and then to return with impunity. Probably if criminal proceedings were brought under similar circumstances in other
states, even in those which have given extensive application to the
estoppel-inequity doctrine, a similar result would be reached, assuming a local statute made bigamous cohabition criminal. 9 It would
seem that consistency, if the matter is here one of making effective
local policy with respect to divorce, should lead to a pattern of recognition or nonrecognition, as the case might be, in such a manner as to
preclude any benefit to the migrating spouse.
With this thought in mind, one can readily agree with the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals that a divorce obtained in Oklahoma by
a resident of Texas under a simulated Oklahoma residence should be
treated as of no effect in Texas when the state intervenes to prosecute
on a charge of bigamous cohabition. It is also easy enough to go
along with the holding in the Washington Tamke case, since the
37 See Harper, supra note 19; Merrill, supra note 19.

8s 325 U.S. 226 (1945).

"9 This would seemingly be true in Washington, since the prosecution would involve
the effect of the divorce on marital relations.
40 See Reed v. State, 148 Trex. Crim. 409, 187 S.W.2d 660 (1945).
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result there was designed to penalize migration by denying to Mrs.
Tamke a claim against Mr. Tamke's estate. The court was not saying
to Mrs. Tamke, "We are denying your claim, because the decree which
you obtained in Nevada is entitled to recognition in Washington."
On the contrary, what it was in effect saying was: "Your claim is not
entitled to full faith and credit in Washington, but we will not permit
you to rely upon its ineffectiveness, because to do so would permit
you to take advantage of activities of which we disapprove, i.e., your
migration to Nevada for the sole purpose of evading our divorce
policy."
By way of contrast, in the Englund case Mrs. Englund reaped a
benefit from her Idaho decree, even though the background circumstances were such that it was obvious that all concerned were willing
to circumvent the result which might have been reached had the
divorce petition been filed in Washington. There is an inconsistency
between the Tamke and Englund cases if in fact the over-all policy
in Washington is to discourage resort to a foreign forum when the
domicile of the decree-seeking spouse is in Washington. This policy
seems to be expressed clearly enough in the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act as adopted by the Washington legislature in 1949."' The
argument might be, as was that of the majority in the Englund case,
that the act was not intended to disturb the pre-existing estoppel
doctrine. A ready answer to that argument may not be available, since
the evidence as to what was intended is meager. However, the legislatures of nine states and the Commission on Uniform Laws must
have intended the legislation to operate as a brake on peregrinations
abroad to secure divorce decrees. Otherwise the legislation would
not have been recommended and enacted. It is not unreasonable to
assume that the thought was that the migrant should be discouraged
by nonrecognition of the decree at the forum when recognition would
enable him to secure an advantage in spite of his effort to evade local
divorce policy.
When the Supreme Court decided the first Williams case, it reduced
considerably the area of permissible nonrecognition of foreign divorce
decrees. The area was unnecessarily and more drastically reduced
when it decided the Johnson case, since the decision in that case made
it possible for cooperative spouses to evade their own laws." Now
-1 For a discussion of the Uniform Act with particular reference to both California
and Washington, see 43 CAL. L. REv. 881 (1955). See also Marsh, The Uniform
Dizorce Recognition Act, 24 WAsH. L. REv. 259 (1949).

42 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
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many of the state courts, such as those of California, New York, and
Washington, are to one degree or another cooperating further by
recognizing for particular purposes the local validity of decrees that
are not entitled to full faith and credit, even under the narrow limits
set by the Supreme Court. A justification that may be given, at least
insofar as New York and California are concerned, is that the divorce
laws of these states are too restrictive-in New York because of the
single ground or in California because of the postponement of the
finality of local decrees-thus making immediate remarriage illegal.
Recognition, though not required, so it may be thought, serves to
alleviate the hardship imposed by local strictures which are not
realistic, human nature being what it is. A further thought may be
that courts are presented with hardship situations in which it is better
to recognize to some extent the legitimacy of a new marriage or change
in status at the expense of what otherwise appears to be state divorce
policy. An answer is that if the domicile divorce laws are too strict,
change them. The very fact that it has been difficult to bring about
legislative change is indicative of strong-rooted approval of the status
quo. When a court broadens the area of recognition, it by that much
thwarts the operation of its local divorce laws. The issue here is not
one of giving or not giving validity to something that is invalid, but
essentially one of deciding whether what the court has a right to do
should be done in the light of its possible effect on local policy with
respect to divorce.

